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Smart TSO-DSO interactions schemes, market architectures and ICT solutions for the integration of ancillary services from demand side management and distributed generation

Modelling real-time markets : **market design** for provision of **ancillary services** from DER for different **TSO-DSO** coordination schemes

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• Balancing services





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- Balancing services
- Congestion management
 - At the transmission grid level



Forecasted congested transmission line



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- Balancing services
- Congestion management
 - At the transmission grid level
 - At the distribution grid level (medium voltage)





For the market simulation, the following **services** procured by the **TSO/DSOs** are considered and are **procured together**

- Balancing services
- Congestion management
 - At the transmission grid level
 - At the distribution grid level (medium voltage)
- In addition, the goal is also to avoid creating voltage problems in the distribution grid (medium voltage)

➔ Requirement for transmission and distribution grid models in the market clearing algorithm



Avoid **under** or **overvoltages** when providing the services





- Transmission grid model only
- Congestion management DSO level is tackled outside market







- Transmission + distribution grid models
- Minimize total activation costs for TSO and DSOs

Common TSO-DSO AS market (centralized)







- Transmission + distribution grid models
- Maximize welfare
- **CMPs** (e.g. BRP) allowed **to purchase flexibility** offers on the market, in competition with SO
 - → TSOs, DSOs need to **explicitly bid** on the AS market

Integrated flexibility market





market 2

Market design specificities for different TSO-DSO coordination schemes



market 1

aggregated and sent to the TSO AS market



Distribution grid 2

Local

market 2

Market design specificities for different TSO-DSO coordination schemes



Medium

Voltage

Local

market 1

Distribution grid 1

- DSO is responsible to collect bids from DER on a local market and to (smartly) aggregate them and send them on TSO market
- Smart aggregation
 - Take **distribution grid** constraints into account
 - Solve **DSO problems** (congestion) for any quantity proposed in the bid





- DSO and TSO agree in advance on a power profile exchange at the HV-MV substation
- Each **market** solves its balancing and congestion problems using its own resources





Key market design ingredients

Network Dimension Which **mathematical models** for the distribution and transmission grids in the market clearing algorithm ?



What are the market clearing **frequency**, time **granularity** and **horizon** ?

Bidding Dimension How market actors can bid ? What market products are proposed?

Clearing Dimension

What are the objectives of the market clearing ?



What price is paid to the activated bids ?





Use of **different models** for the **transmission** and **distribution** grids



Generic approach to test **combinations** of important **timing parameters**

- **Time horizon** of the market (optimisation window, delivery period): e.g. 30 min
- **Time granularity** of the market horizon: e.g. 5 min
- Market clearing frequency: e.g. 30 min

 \rightarrow The shorter, the better, but limited by optimization problem complexity (market clearing duration)



The market is a **closed-gate auction**.



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 - e.g. horizon = 30 min, frequency = 5 min, granularity = 5 min



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- **Rolling optimisation concept** when time horizon larger than market clearing frequency AND time granularity:
 - e.g. horizon = 30 min, frequency = 5 min, granularity = 5 min
 - Results for the first time step are a firm decision. It contains the actual activation of flexible assets and has to be followed by the aggregators/owners
 - Results for the next time steps are (mostly) advisory decisions. They
 will assist the aggregators and the TSO to anticipate the availability
 of flexibility in the upcoming time steps.



The market is a **closed-gate auction**.





A catalogue of market products is proposed, to allow all flexibility providers to be on a level playing field

- Bids are energy offers/asks, defined by quantity/price pairs in their simplest form
- Curtailable or non-curtailable
- Extension to multi-period bids when time horizon is larger than the time granularity
- **Complex** contraints
 - Temporal constraints
 - Logical constraints
- Binary variables are needed to express some of these constraints (e.g. a simple noncurtailable bid requires a binary variable)
- ➔ MISOCP Optimisation problem



Logical constraints (Inter-bid)

- Implication: \rightarrow Series factory lines
- Exclusive Choice: → Parallel factory lines
- **Deferability**: \rightarrow Wet appliances

Temporal constraints (Intra-bid)

- Accept-All-Time-Steps-or None: → Profile tracking
- Ramping: → Turbines
- Max. number of activations:
 → Avoiding wear & tear
- Max. duration of activation: → Air conditioning
- Min. duration of activation: →
 Plant efficiency
- Min. delay between activations: → Avoiding wear & tear; cool-down and warmup
- Integral: → Electric storage



Optimization objective under network and bid constraints

- Minimize activation costs and maximizing welfare may return different results
- Objective is to minimize the activation costs in all coord. Schemes, except for the integrated flexibility market TSO-DSO CS
- Maximizing social welfare for the latest, since regulated and non-regulated entities are in competition for the same flexibility resources



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Locational marginal price (LMP) chosen to remunerate bidders

- Potentially different prices for each network node (in the model), due to:
 - Losses
 - Congestions
- Pros: Projects real value of flexibility at each node
- Cons: Complex pricing mechanism and intuitiveness





A part of the **computational tractability** of the **market clearing algorithm depends on** the **design choices**...

- **SOCP** network model for **distribution** grid
 - → more accurate model BUT computationally more challenging than linear model
 - → Tractability also depends on the size of network to handle
- Introducing **binary variables complicates a lot** the optimisation problem (**MISOCP**), but needed for many market products (e.g. a simple non-curtailable bid)
 - ➔ Need to limit and/or make sure not too many binary variables are introduced (i.e. make sure it is worth to have them)
- A time horizon with multiple time steps may be advantageous but also introduces further computational complexity (e.g. bids with inter-temporal constraints)



... another part of the computational tractability depends on the TSO-DSO coordination scheme

Centralized AS market	Common TSO- DSO AS market (centralized)	Integrated flexibility market	Local AS market	Common TSO- DSO AS market (decentralized)	Shared balancing responsibility model
The easiest since only transmission grid	The most difficult since full transmission AND distribution grids in a single problem		Optimizations in parallel BUT with smart aggregation using some complexity		Many optimizations in parallel

Computational tractability linked to TSO-DSO coordination scheme mainly **depends on** whether they are **centralized** or **decentralized**

- → direct impact on the **network dimension** to tackle in the **optimisation** problem
- Quite challenging to solve the coord. schemes with full networks included (transmission grid + multiple distribution grids)
 - → Ongoing work on **spatial (network) decomposition methods** to efficiently solve such problems



Challenges and next steps

 Your feedback is welcome : preliminary report on market design and algorithm (<u>Deliverable D2.4</u>) available on <u>SmartNet website</u>

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http://smartnet-project.eu/
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- Run the algorithms on real data instances form simulated scenarios (Denmark, Italy, Spain) to compare the different TSO-DSO coordination schemes
- Computational Tractability issues: solving a MISOCP (market clearing) in a few minutes is challenging → investigation of efficients methods to tackle this issue
- Data availability: e.g. prediction of injection/offtake at network nodes, scheduled TSO-DSO exchange profiles





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Thank You

