



## Public Workshop 20 June 2018

### Real-time market architectures

Market design for provision of ancillary services from DER  
for different TSO-DSO coordination schemes



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 691405

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Grid & Market Group, N-SIDE

# Outline


- SmartNet AS **market scope** in the simulation platform
- **Market design ingredients**
  - Key **generic** ingredients
  - **TSO-DSO** coordination scheme **specifics**
- **Challenges**

# Outline

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For the market simulation, the following **services** procured by the **TSO/DSOs** are considered and are **procured together**


- **Balancing** services






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- **Balancing** services
- **Congestion** management
  - At the **transmission** grid level



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
- **Balancing** services
- **Congestion** management
  - At the **transmission** grid level
  - At the **distribution** grid level (medium voltage)



For the market simulation, the following **services** procured by the **TSO/DSOs** are considered and are **procured together**

- **Balancing** services
- **Congestion** management
  - At the **transmission** grid level
  - At the **distribution** grid level (medium voltage)
- In addition, the goal is also to **avoid creating voltage problems** in the distribution grid (medium voltage)
- ➔ Requirement for **transmission** and **distribution grid models** in the **market clearing algorithm**
- ➔ Need for **network observability** and ability to **forecast** the near future network state

Avoid **under** or **overvoltages** when providing the services



## SmartNet market deals with procurement/activation of the **energy, not reserves**

- SmartNet market algorithm **does not cope with the reserve dimensioning and procurement**, although also relevant to study.
- In the RIA SmartNet, we are **not tied to a particular product** (e.g. aFRR, mFRR), but the services would typically :
  - **Encompass mFRR/RR products time frame**
  - **Not encompass aFRR** (update of setpoint every few seconds) or **FCR** (local controller) time frame DUE to timing reasons:
    - aFRR: update of set points every few seconds
    - FCR: local controller reacting on local frequency measurements

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# Key market design ingredients

## Network Dimension

Which **mathematical models** for the distribution and transmission grids in the market clearing algorithm ?

## Timing Dimension

What are the the market clearing **frequency**, time **granularity** and **horizon** ?

## Bidding Dimension

How market actors can bid ? What market products are proposed?


## Clearing Dimension

What are the objectives of the market clearing ?

## Pricing Dimension

What price is paid to the activated bids ?

# Which **network models** for the **transmission** and **distribution** grids?



Need to choose **convex approximation/relaxations** of the network models to make them **computationally tractable** in a **market clearing optimization** algorithm since **binary variables** are also part of the problem.

## Use of **different models** for the **transmission** and **distribution** grids

### Transmission grid

1 model

Traditional **Linear** DC approximation

- **No losses** are modelled
- Voltage angles between neighbours are small
- **No reactive power** notion, **constant voltage** magnitude

### MV **distribution** grid

3 models

#### 1) **SOC** BFM (distflow) model

- **Losses** are modelled
  - **Active** and **reactive power** are modelled
  - Exact solution in many realistic cases
- BUT tuning of a penalty** term in objective **difficult** to achieve

#### 2) **Linear** Ben-Tal relaxation model

- **Linearize** conic constraints
- Allows to use efficient MILP warm-start capabilities of (commercial) solvers

#### 3) **Linear** Simplified distflow model


- **No losses** are modelled
- Equivalent of DC approximation used at transmission
- No need to tune penalty term



## Generic approach to test combinations of important timing parameters

The market is a closed-gate auction.


- **Time horizon** of the market (optimisation window, delivery period): e.g. 30 min
- **Time granularity** of the market horizon: e.g. 5 min
- **Market clearing frequency**: e.g. 30 min
  - The shorter, the better, but limited by optimization problem complexity (market clearing duration)
- **Max Full Activation time (FAT)** of the product: e.g. max 10 min
  - in SmartNet simulator, we assume 0 min, for sake of simplicity
- **Max clearing time** = Max allowed time for market clearing algorithm to return the decisions: e.g. 5 min
- **Gate closure Time (GCT)** : e.g. 15 min before delivery period starts (10 min FAT + 5 min market time)



A catalogue of **market products** is proposed, to allow all flexibility providers to be on a **level playing field**

- **Bids** are energy offers/asks, defined by **quantity/price** pairs in their simplest form
- **Curtable** or **non-curtable**
- Extension to **multi-period bids** when time horizon is larger than the time granularity
- **Complex** constraints
  - **Temporal** constraints
  - **Logical** constraints
- **Binary variables** are needed to express some of these constraints (e.g. a simple non-curtable bid requires a binary variable)

➔ **MISOCP/MILP Optimisation** problem



#### Temporal constraints (Intra-bid)

- **Accept-All-Time-Steps-or-None:** → Profile tracking
- **Ramping:** → Turbines
- **Max. number of activations:** → Avoiding wear & tear
- **Max. duration of activation:** → Air conditioning
- **Min. duration of activation:** → Plant efficiency
- **Min. delay between activations:** → Avoiding wear & tear; cool-down and warm-up
- **Integral:** → Electric storage




#### Logical constraints (Inter-bid)

- **Implication:** → Series factory lines
- **Exclusive Choice:** → Parallel factory lines
- **Deferability:** → Wet appliances


# Optimization **objective** under **network** and **bid** constraints

- **Minimize activation costs** and **maximizing welfare** may return different results
- Objective is to **minimize the activation costs** in all coord. Schemes, **except** for the *integrated flexibility market* TSO-DSO Coord. Scheme
- Maximizing social welfare for the latest, since regulated and non-regulated entities are in competition for the same flexibility resources



# Locational "Nodal" marginal price (LMP) chosen to remunerate bidders

- Potentially **different prices** for each network **node** (in the model), due to:
  - Losses
  - Congestions
- Pros:** Projects real value of flexibility at each node
- Cons:** Complex pricing mechanism and intuitiveness



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## CS A: Centralized AS market



Net power injection at node  $i$  =  
Sum of power generated at node  $i$   
- Sum of power consumed at node  $i$

$\text{Market}_{\max}$  = Max time allowed for market algorithm (+pre/post-processing)

$\text{FAT}_{\max}$  = Max full activation time for the product

1 TSO (SO) sends the **forecasted grid state**, per market time step (granularity), to the market operator before GCT:

- Forecasted **net nodal power injection**
- **Operational limits** (if changed)
- **Grid topology** (if changed)
- **Scheduled/Agreed Flows** at **borders**





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- CMP (FSP: Flexibility Service Providers) send **bids** to the MO (TSO), at transmission grid nodal resolution





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



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- 4 MO transmits **market** results to TSO (4) and
- 5 activates/dispatches FSP (5)




## CS D1: Common TSO-DSO AS market (centralized)

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
**FAT<sub>max</sub>** = Max full activation time for the product

1 TSO and DSO (SO) sends their **forecasted grid state**, per market time step (granularity), to the market operator before **GCT**:

- Forecasted **net nodal power injection**
- **Operational limits** (if changed)
- **Grid topology** (if changed)
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Forecasted **imbalance** = -15MW





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



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

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- 3 MO runs the market clearing algorithm: it computes the accepted bid quantities and nodal marginal price. MO transmits market results to TSO AND DSO (4) and activates/dispatches FSP (5)





## CS B: Local AS market

- 1 TSO/DSO (SO) send the **forecasted grid state**, per market time step (granularity), to the TSO/DSO (MO), before GCT:
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  - **Scheduled/Agreed Flows** at **borders**





## CS B: Local AS market

- CMP (FSP) send **bids** from **Transmission Grid** connected **resources** to the **MO (TSO)**, at transmission grid nodal resolution





## CS B: Local AS market

- CMP (FSP) send **bids** from **Distribution Grid** connected **resources** to the **MO (DSO)**, at **distribution grid nodal resolution (Medium Voltage)**







Each **MO (DSO)** clears its **local market** to **solve** any **local** issues (**congestions**), if any. Bids quantities are then kept aside for the DSO.







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

## CS B: Local AS market

- Each **MO (DSO)** aggregates (smartly) remaining local market bids into a **bid** (or residual supply function) to be submitted to the **TSO (MO) market**, before  $GCT_{TSO}$





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6 MO (TSO) runs the market clearing algorithm: it computes the **accepted bid quantities** and **nodal marginal price**.





## CS B: Local AS market

- 7 MO (TSO) transmits **market** results to TSO (7) and
- 8 activates/dispatches FSP (8), both **CMP (Tx)** and **DSOs (MO)**





## CS B: Local AS market

MO (DSO) performs the disaggregation (9), transmits market results to DSO (SO) (10) and activates/dispatches FSP (11)





**Same steps as in CS B2 BUT no step 3 : local congestions problems are not solved beforehand**

- Same steps as in CS B2 BUT no step 3 : local congestions problems are not solved beforehand**



# CS C: Shared balancing responsibility

- 1 TSO/DSO (SO) agree and define a **schedule** for the exchange of power at each primary substation (HV-MC connecting edge)






# CS C: Shared balancing responsibility

- 2 TSO/DSO (SO) send the **forecasted grid state**, per market time step (granularity), to the TSO/DSO (MO), before GCT:
- Forecasted **net nodal power injection**
  - **Operational limits** (if changed)
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  - **Scheduled/Agreed Flows** at **borders**

Forecasted TSO imbalance = -12MW




Local market

Forecasted DSO 1 imbalance = +2MW

Forecasted DSO 2 imbalance = -5MW



Local market 2







# CS C: Shared balancing responsibility

- CMP(Dx)/CMP(Tx)** send **bids** from
- Distribution/Transmission Grid** connected **resources** to the **MO (DSO)/ MO (TSO)**, at distribution/transmission grid nodal resolution





# CS C: Shared balancing responsibility

- 4 MO (TSO)/MO(DSO) runs the market clearing
- 4 algorithm: it computes the accepted bid quantities and nodal marginal price.



# CS C: Shared balancing responsibility

MO (TSO)/MO(DSO) transmits **market** results to TSO (5 5) and activates/dispatches CMP (6 6)



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A part of the **computational tractability** of the market clearing algorithm **depends on** the intrinsic design choices...

- **SOCP** network model for **distribution** grid
  - ➔ more accurate model BUT **computationally** more **challenging** than **linear** model
  - ➔ **Tractability** also depends on the **size of network** to handle

**Italian scenario** = one 4000 nodes HV Transmission grid + **700 MV distribution grids** for a total of **about 10 000 nodes**)

- Introducing **binary variables** **complicates a lot** the optimisation problem (**MISOCP**), but needed for many market products (e.g. a simple non-curtable bid)
  - ➔ **Need to limit** and/or make sure not too many **binary variables** are introduced (i.e. make sure it is worth to have them)
- A time horizon with **multiple time steps** may be advantageous but **also introduces further computational complexity** (e.g. bids with inter-temporal constraints)

... another part of the **computational tractability** depends on the **TSO-DSO coordination scheme**

Centralized AS market	Common TSO-DSO AS market (centralized)	Integrated flexibility market	Local AS market	Common TSO-DSO AS market (decentralized)	Shared balancing responsibility model
The <b>easiest</b> since only transmission grid	The <b>most difficult</b> since full transmission AND distribution grids in a single problem		Optimizations in parallel BUT with smart aggregation using some complexity		Many optimizations in parallel

**Computational tractability** linked to TSO-DSO coordination scheme mainly **depends on** whether they are **centralized** or **decentralized**

- ➔ direct impact of the **network dimension** to tackle on the **optimisation** problem
- ➔ Quite challenging to solve the coord. schemes with full networks included (**transmission grid + multiple distribution grids**)

# SmartNet



[SmartNet-Project.eu](http://SmartNet-Project.eu)

This presentation reflects only the author's view and the Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA) is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.



Thank You

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




## A bit more on “Smart” aggregation by the DSO

- (Remaining) **bids** on **local markets** need to be **transferred** to the **TSO market**
- **Easy solution:**
  - **transmit bids** to the TSO market platform **without** any network constraints check
  - BUT **no guarantee** that distribution grid constraints will be satisfied for the bids activated by TSO
- **Medium solution:**
  - Transmit bids to the TSO market platform, provided they are prequalified according to a simple method.
  - But **how** to do that in a **simple, transparent** and **fair** manner?
- **Difficult but smart solution:**
  - **Aggregate** bids in local markets according to an **objective** and satisfying **network constraints**

Common TSO-DSO AS market (decentralized)  
Local AS market



## DSO smart aggregation

- **Smart aggregation** via parametric optimisation on the flow of DSO-TSO line
  - Computationally demanding
- **Curse of dimensionality** in parametric optimisation
  - Multi-dimensional space exploration is not tractable

