



Smart TSO-DSO interaction schemes, market architectures and ICT
Solutions for the integration of ancillary services from demand side
management and distributed generation

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The SmartNet Project

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Agenda

- The project SmartNet
- Year 1 – Year 2 – Year 3
- Five TSO-DSO coordination schemes
- Proposed AS market design
- The simulation platform
- Cost-benefit analysis of the coordination schemes
- Layout of three project pilots
- Some preliminary regulatory reflections

- Increased reserve needs due to explosion of variable RES
- Opportunities from new DER in distribution?
- Five key questions:

Which ancillary services could be provided from entities located in distribution networks	How the architectures of dispatching services markets should be consequently revised
Which optimized modalities for managing the network at the TSO-DSO interface	What ICT on distribution-transmission border to guarantee observability and control
Which implications on the on-going market coupling process	

“Some actions can have a negative cross-network effect. For instance, TSO use of distributed resources for balancing purposes has the potential to exacerbate DSO constraints. Equally, whilst DSO use of innovative solutions, such as active network management, can deliver benefits to customers, if not managed properly they may in some cases counteract actions taken by the TSO” (CEER Position Paper on the Future DSO and TSO Relationship – Ref. C16-DS-26-04 – 21.09.2016)

Article 32

Tasks of distribution system operators in the use of flexibility

1. Member States shall provide the necessary regulatory framework to allow and incentivise distribution system operators to procure services in order to improve efficiencies in the operation and development of the distribution system, including local congestion management. In particular, regulatory frameworks shall enable distribution system operators to procure services from resources such as distributed generation, demand response or storage and consider energy efficiency measures, which may supplant the need to upgrade or replace electricity capacity and which support the efficient and secure operation of the distribution system. Distribution system operators shall procure these services according to transparent, non-discriminatory and market based procedures.


Distribution system operators shall define standardised market products for the services procured ensuring effective participation of all market participants including renewable energy sources, de
operators shall exchange all n
system operators in order to
secure and efficient operation

EC (2016) Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on common rules for the internal market in electricity

Winter package assigns a role to DSOs for local congestion management, but not for balancing

Project video: <https://vimeo.com/220969294/73d98edde6>



- **architectures for optimized interaction between TSOs and DSOs** in managing the purchase of ancillary services from subjects located in distribution.
- **three national cases** (Italy, Denmark, Spain);
- **ad hoc simulation platform** (physical network, market and ICT)
- **CBA** to assess which TSO-DSO coordination scheme is optimal for the three countries.
- use of **full replica lab** to test performance of real controller devices.
- **three physical pilots** to demonstrate capability to monitor and control distribution by TSO and flexibility services that can be offered by distribution (thermal inertia of indoor swimming pools, distributed storage of radio-base stations).




The SmartNet project <http://SmartNet-Project.eu>




Number of Partners






TSO-DSO coordination schemes

Centralized AS market model




5 possible coordination schemes TSOs & DSOs for AS by distributed flexibility resources


- Centralized AS market model
- Local AS market model
- Shared balancing responsibility model
- Common TSO-DSO AS market model
- Integrated flexibility market model




Local AS market model



Shared balancing responsibility model



Common TSO-DSO AS market model





Legend



Role (Actor)	
Centralized market	
Local market	
Coordinated market	
Pre-defined profile exchange	
Aggregation	
Market bids	
Pre-qualification	

Proposed Market Design

- **Considered services:** **balancing** and **congestion** management at transmission (HV) and distribution level (MV), including voltage constraint at MV
- **Rolling optimisation concept:** Results for the **first** time step are a **firm** decision. Results for the **next** time steps are **advisory** decisions.
- **Network representation:** DC approximation for HV, SOCP for MV
- **Market products:** implementation of typical constraints of flexibility providers (extension to **multi-period bids** with **temporal** and **logical** constraints
- **Representation of arbitrage opportunity between cascading markets:** day-ahead, intraday, AS market




The simulation platform



Balancing market and aFRR

- aFRR volume already activated before T and not yet released
- Forecasted further aFRR volume activated to compensated imbalance between T and T+1
- Actual aFRR volume activated between T and T+1 (different from forecast due to forecast errors and CS imperfections in representing the system)
- Volume of tertiary reserve activated by the AS market at T+1



System imbalance not «seen» by the AS market (e.g. CS-A disregards congestion in distribution), is trapped by aFRR and economically penalized


PLATFORM LAYER	REGULATION	PAYMENT	ACTIVATION	BIDDING
Market layer	AS market	Pay as clear	Market clearing	Bids
Physical layer	aFRR regulation	Pay as bid Pay as clear	Pro quota	$\begin{cases} (1+p\%) * UPBids \\ (1-p\%) * DWNBids \end{cases}$ Highest market nodal price

- Literature review:
 - EPRI/JRC
 - REALISEGRID
 - e-Highway2050
- Proposed CBA indicators:
 - **Reduction of total AS market cost** (not social welfare!)
 - **Reduction of secondary regulation activations** due to:
 - **congestion not “seen” by the AS market**
 - **Forecasting errors**
 - **Losses in transmission** (not considered by AS market)
- Sensitivity factors
 - **Emissions savings:** with standard emission rates for each generation technology and CO2 prices forecasted at studied horizon.
- Side indicators (not in CBA to avoid double count)
 - **Cost percentage due to network limitations:** comparing costs with Ideal situation (bus-bar network)
 - **Reduction of transmission network losses**



ICT costs include communication, market clearing software).... Steps :

1. Comparison of the coordination schemes in terms of functionalities and ICT
2. Convert each ICT system into a cost at target year

Main focus on issues that can differ between coordination schemes.



Pilot A: Distribution monitoring and control




Aggregation of information
in RT at TSO-DSO interconnection
(HV/MV transformer)



Voltage regulation
by generators connected at HV and
MV levels

Power-frequency regulation / balancing
by generators connected at HV and MV
levels

Common TSO-DSO AS market model



Pilot C: Ancillary services from radio-base stations



Congestion management
at DSO level

Demand Response Aggregation
by using storage flexibility (BS and EV)

Power-frequency regulation / balancing
by respecting the exchange program at the
TSO-DSO interconnection

Some preliminary regulatory reflections

- If the contribution from entities in distribution will grow, DSOs should **implement real time network monitoring** and TSOs could need to **share with DSOs part of responsibility** for the provision of AS.
- Whatever coordination scheme is implemented, it is important that that actions taken by the **TSO and DSO don't cause counteracting effects** (e.g. between local congestion management and balancing) – see CEER Position Paper on Future DSO-TSO Relationship
- between the different AS markets, “**common marketplace**” (see ENTSO-E working paper on Distributed Flexibility and the value of TSO/DSO cooperation) is preferable in order to avoid duplicating bids and avoiding double activations.
- before implementing a separate market for a given AS, it should be attentively considered if it can be **sufficiently liquid** (e.g. local congestion management in distribution).
- restructuring national AS markets should take into account possibility of a **seamless integration with preceding energy markets** (DAM, ID) so as to avoid providing gaming opportunities (e.g. between non-nodal energy markets and nodal AS market)
- new AS architectures should **integrate with on-going transnational integration process** (ENTSO-E platforms): sharing reserve between Countries is a key for allowing further RES integration.
- a **balance** has to be sought for between local optimality (e.g. for a given Country) and the implementation of a harmonized pan-European design.
- **smaller DSOs have to integrate their efforts** in order to be fit for the new responsibilities.
- **real-time market architectures** must take into account the characteristics/constraints of the potential flexibility providers connected to distribution grids
- **aggregators** must be able to provide a simplified interface towards the market, hiding details of flexibility providers, and deliver efficient price signals to incentivize participation from distribution.
- **viable business models** must be available for all market participants, including DERs, aggregators and other customers.
- **network planning** will also have to facilitate better utilization of RES exploiting flexibility.

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Thank You

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